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ABSTRACT
The demographic transitions here are associated with: 1) The shift from hunting and
gathering to agriculture. 2) The industrial revolution. There are puzzles associated with
both of these. In the neolithic transition to agriculture, humans became less well-fed,
smaller, more prone to disease and lived shorter lives. Why then was this new system
chosen? During the second, or “recent,” transition, fertility fell markedly, despite an overall
rise in income. Why did individuals not use the extra income to produce more oﬀspring?
T h ep r e s e n tp a p e rd e v e l o p ss i m p l em o d e l so fc h o i c eo ft h eq u a l i t ya n dq u a n t i t yo fc h i l d r e n ,
as would have been generated by human evolution, reproducing the key phenomena in these
two transitions.
∗I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canada
Research Chair Program for support. I also thank Gary Becker, Knick Harley, Paul Klein, Gord Myers,
Emöke Szathmáry, and audiences at Chicago, Northwestern, Penn State, UBC, Wisconsin and UC Davis for
helpful comments.
1I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of the present paper is to relate and illuminate two remarkable episodes in human
history. The ﬁrst of these episodes was the displacement of hunting and gathering (foraging)
by agriculture. Agriculture began perhaps ten thousand years ago in the fertile crescent in
the Middle East, and not long after that in China and in the Western Hemisphere. There
was not an immediate unambiguous improvement in the human condition following this shift.
Apparently, instead, malnutrition became more common, humans became smaller, infectious
diseases became more prevalent, and mean age at death decreased. How can these eﬀects
be reconciled with the relentless spread of agriculture across Europe? Why does this not
violate any reasonable account of rational individual choice?
The second episode is more recent and better documented. During the industrial rev-
olution in 19th century Europe, mortality rates ﬁrst fell markedly, but then, a little later,
birth rates also declined. Overall population growth usually rose, but then declined back
to a moderate level, with lower mortality rates and birth rates than before. Incomes rose
on average during this recent transition. How can such rising incomes be reconciled with
lower fertility? Wouldn’t any preferences that were consistent with these observations be
inconsistent with the maximization of the number of oﬀspring, at least during the transition
itself?
The present paper shows that these phenomena in the two demographic transitions are
generated by two simple related models. In either model, there are two overlapping age
classes–young and adult. Young individuals are subject to mortality, so not all of them
2survive to be adult. Adults determine both the quantity of their oﬀspring and the capital
invested in each of them. A key assumption is that the preferences over the quality and
quantity of oﬀspring are evolutionarily optimal, deriving from maximizing the long-run num-
ber of descendants over all of our history as hunter-gatherers. These preferences are taken
to be ﬁxed in the short-run. However, short-run behavior during either transition remains
completely consistent with the maximization of biological ﬁtness. In either model, there are
feedback eﬀects from the size of the population that eventually choke oﬀ growth. One such
feedback eﬀect reduces individual output, reﬂecting limited natural resources such as land.
To model the neolithic transition, the capital invested in oﬀspring is interpreted as somatic
capital, that is, as the energy used to build the body of each individual. In this model,
Model A, the probability of individual survival incorporates another negative feedback eﬀect
from increased population, that arising from increased infectious disease. The instigating
factor in the neolithic transition is a technology shift to agriculture that raises productivity.
This implies that individuals would prefer agriculture over foraging if both economic systems
were available. Model A then predicts that the transition will raise mortality, because it
raises population, in the long run. Fertility rises but somatic capital falls, also in this long
run. Thus individuals put greater emphasis on the quantity of children at the expense of
their somatic capital endowment. Intuitively, quality relates to the potential number of
grandchildren, so that quality is aﬀected twice as much as is quantity by the increase in
mortality. Finally, detailed dynamic properties of the transition are derived, with short-run
eﬀects that exaggerate those arising in the long run.
3To capture the more recent transition, an interpretation of capital as human capital, such
as education, is favored in Model B. Now mortality is taken to be a basic instigating factor
for the transition. It is subjected to an exogenous decrease, reﬂecting the advent of cheap
but eﬀective public health measures. As a complementary factor, productivity rises due to
industrialization. In the long run, the combined eﬀects of better health and industrialization
raise population, human capital, and income. Fertility, on the other hand, is predicted to
fall. Intuitively, again, quality is aﬀected more than is quantity by the decrease in mortality.
Finally, detailed dynamic properties of Model B are derived. Fertility is predicted to rise
in the short run, as is characteristic of the actual transition in many countries. Similarly,
income may fall in the short run, and there is evidence consistent with this prediction also.
Model A then shows that the apparently anomalous eﬀects during the neolithic transition
to agriculture can be derived from economically reasonable preferences over the quantity and
quality of oﬀspring. Furthermore, such preferences would have been generated by natural
selection over our history as hunter-gatherers. In terms of these, individuals would have
voluntarily shifted from foraging to agriculture to foraging, for example. Model B similarly
resolves the key puzzle of the recent 19th century demographic transition. That is, in terms
of the same ﬁxed evolutionarily induced preferences, individuals would have chosen lower
fertility despite higher incomes. Moreover, the predicted short-run behavior during the
transition itself is evolutionarily optimal.
There is a fascinating previous literature in anthropology and economics on the two
transitions considered here. Discussion of the precise relationship of the present approach
4to this previous literature is, however, deferred to Sections II.C and III.D, for Models A and
B, respectively.
II. THE NEOLITHIC TRANSITION TO AGRICULTURE
II.A. Facts and Issues
II.A.1. The Spread of Agriculture in Europe, Population Growth
The large scale adoption of agriculture and a settled way of life at the expense of hunting
and gathering occurred a remarkably short time ago. Agriculture seems to have arisen in
the fertile crescent in the Middle East roughly 10,000 years ago. It started spreading about
9,000 years ago, taking about 4,000 years to spread to the northern and western fringes
of Europe–Scandinavia, England and Spain–moving at about 1 kilometer a year. This
transition was associated with a sharp rise in population. Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza
[1995, Chapter 6] discuss the traces that this left in the modern European gene pool.1
Indeed the ﬁrst principal component of the present genetic geographic distribution gen-
erates a map that matches well the map of the arrival date of agriculture as estimated from
radiocarbon dating of the earliest associated remains. Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza
[1995] hypothesize that the genotype of the hunter-gatherers originally in the fertile crescent
diﬀered noticeably from those in Europe. As the population of farmers rose, there was a
wave of emigration into neighboring lands. The genotype of these emigrants was then diluted
1See also Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza [1984], and Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza [1994, Chapter
5.11].
5by that of the original hunter-gatherer inhabitants so, as this wave progressed further away
from the Middle East, the resulting dilution increased. Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza
emphasize that the spread of agriculture was not purely the spread of an idea, but involved
the movement of people themselves.2
More direct evidence concerning the sharp rise in population following the transition to
agriculture is provided by Bocquet-Appel [2002], who studies the age distribution of skeletons
found in neolithic graveyards. Other things equal, that is, the higher the proportion of
skeletons of the young, the more rapidly growing the population is deduced to have been.
He ﬁnds such evidence of a wave of population growth spreading across Europe that is
consistent with the genetic and radiocarbon evidence.
II.A.2 Evidence on Health, Nutrition, Stature and Life Expectancy.
Inevitably enough this transition was once considered a necessary ﬁrst step towards mod-
ern industrial society–part of the triumphant march of human progress. Recently, however,
a much more interesting possibility has been emerging.3
In the ﬁrst place, the greater incidence of skeletal lesions suggest that the adoption of
2Corroborating evidence is provided by Gray and Atkinson [2003], who use statistical linguistic analysis
to infer that the English language, for example, originated about 9,000 years ago in what is now Turkey.
3Diamond [1997, Chapters 4-10], and Tudge [1998], provide informal accounts of this new view. The
basic reference for all the following precise evidence is Cohen and Armelagos [1984]. This is a symposium of
work on the eﬀect of this transformation world-wide, as summarized in Chapter 23. Steckel and Rose [2002]
is a more recent symposium, concentrating on the Western Hemisphere, but coming to generally similar
conclusions.
6agriculture was associated with a rise in infectious disease. Such diseases may have been
less prevalent among hunter-gatherers because of their low population densities, but became
more prevalent with the greater densities implied by agriculture.
In the second place, and verging on the paradoxical, the advent of agriculture was appar-
ently associated with a higher incidence of chronic malnutrition. Evidence for this can be
found in the porosity of the skull associated with anemia, since the likely cause of this latter
disorder is inadequate nutrition. Indeed, agriculture seems not even to have reduced the
variability in the food supply from that under foraging. The occasional famine caused by
crop failure may have been more severe than the shortfalls in food obtained from foraging.
This is suggested by evidence of physiological stress, such as irregular growth patterns of
bones and, particularly, dental enamel. As a result of this worsening in the food supply,
there may have also been a concomitant decrease in physical stature.
On the other hand, it may be that hunting and gathering was more physically demanding
than was agriculture, although this might be a matter of peak eﬀort rather than the total
work load. This is suggested by a possible reduction in arthritis, for example, after the
advent of agriculture.
Finally, estimates of the age at death for the skeletons that are available, combined
with estimates of the steady state growth rate of the population, suggest a decrease in life
expectancy occurred with agriculture.
II.A.3. Issues
The conclusions drawn here have not escaped criticism, notably from Wood et al [1992],
7who suggest, for example, that the data are equally consistent with an improvement in
health in the transition from foraging to agriculture. That is, the presence of bone lesions
in a particular skeleton might mean that this individual was actually more resistant to the
associated diseases than was another individual who succumbed before forming any such
lesions. If there were a decrease in disease with the transition, the adoption of agriculture
would be less puzzling from a rational choice perspective. On the other hand, the increase
in population density makes an increase in infectious disease otherwise among the least
surprising of the conclusions drawn above.
The best way to address such issues is consider additional evidence. For example, recent
populations in which infectious diseases were largely untreated could illuminate whether
there is a positive or negative correlation between bone lesions in skeletons and the incidence
of disease among the living. Further, such populations could demonstrate the correlation
between population density and the incidence of disease.
Indeed, the perhaps surprising aﬄuence and health of present day hunter-gatherers helps
to reinforce the original conclusions. Sahlins [1988] indeed coined the phrase “the original
aﬄuent society” to reﬂect the apparent high productivity of the !Kung, for example, in
acquiring plant and animal food. (Sahlins argues, however, that this aﬄuence of the !Kung
is achieved in part by lowered expectations.) Robson and Kaplan [2003] also summarize
data from a number of sources showing that hunter-gatherers have surprisingly low mortality
rates and high life expectancy.
Suppose the original interpretations then withstand further scrutiny. This raises the
8awkward question: Why would individuals have chosen to participate in agriculture at the
expense of foraging? Why did agriculture spread? The present paper shows that the
original “naive” interpretations do not, in any case, conﬂict with a straightforward biological
explanation.
II.B Model A.
Model A shows that a rise in population results if agriculture raises per capita productiv-
ity or output. The above evidence concerning a reduction in life expectancy is compatible
with that on the increase in disease. The model incorporates these as eﬀects arising from
the increased population density due to agriculture. The increase in mortality now tends to
reduce somatic capital, or stature, as is also consistent with the evidence. At the same time,
fertility is predicted to rise, so individuals make a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between the quality and
quantity of oﬀspring.
The emphasis in the present paper is thus on why the transition to agriculture had the
eﬀects that it apparently did. The important question of why the transition occurred when
it did is given less emphasis. (But see Section II. C for discussion of some explanations that
have been put forward.)
In detail then, consider a population in which there are just two overlapping age classes–
young and adult. For simplicity, individuals reproduce asexually. Subject to her income,
each adult chooses the quantity of her oﬀspring and the amount of capital, K, say, invested
in each of these. In this neolithic setting, capital is interpreted as somatic or embodied
capital, reﬂecting stature and strength. Undoubtedly, this is subject to genetic inﬂuence,
9which might entail only slow modiﬁcation. However, somatic capital is also subject to rapid
discretionary change, since it is greatly aﬀected by nutrition, especially during growth.
Adult output is then a function of somatic capital, K>0. Additional arguments of
output are the total number of adults, N ≥ 0, and a parameter, α, to reﬂect greater reliance
on agriculture. The following restrictions are then imposed on the production function, F :
Assumption 1. i) As a function of K, the production function for adult output
is similar to that used in the theory of perfect competition. More precisely,
for some ¯ K>0 and each N ≥ 0 and α, there exists ¯ K(N,α) ≥ ¯ K, such that
F(K,N,α)=0 , for K ∈ [0, ¯ K(N,α)]; FK(K,N,α) > 0 and FKK(K,N,α) < 0,
for all K>¯ K(N,α); and FK(K,N,α) → 0, as K →∞ .
ii) The shift to agriculture is advantageous, in that Fα(K,N,α) > 0. On the
other hand, an increase in the number of adults, N, decreases output, since there
are ﬁxed factors such as land, so that FN(K,N,α) < 0. The transition to
agriculture does not increase the marginal productivity of somatic capital, so
that FKα(K,N,α) ≤ 0. Similarly, neither does a larger population increase the
marginal product of capital, so that FKN(K,N,α) ≤ 0.
The assumptions concerning the dependenceo fo u t p u to nc a p i t a la r er e p r e s e n t e di n
Figure 1. There is then a unique capital stock that maximizes the average product of
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Figure 1: Adult Energy Output
11The greater energy productivity of agriculture assumed here would be reinforced by
the presumably lower net energy cost of raising each child under agriculture than under
foraging. With respect to the assumption that FKα(K,N,α) ≤ 0, it is plausible that,
although primitive agriculture was physically demanding, primitive hunting was even more
so, requiring substantial strength, agility and endurance. In the same spirit, it is assumed
that FKN(K,N,α) ≤ 0. Although many of the results below follow if FKN(K,N,α) is
positive and suﬃciently small, the present assumption is for simplicity.
The transition from young to adult is governed as follows:
Assumption 2. The probability of survival from young to adult is p(N) ∈ (0,1),
where p0(N) < 0, for all N ≥ 0.
That is, perhaps the key feedback eﬀect of population N is on survival, reﬂecting the in-
creased prevalence of infectious diseases in a denser population.
An important generalization of the model here would be to allow mortality to be inﬂu-
enced by individual characteristics. For example, if an individual dedicated more energy to
immune function, by increasing the range and depth of antibodies, this could increase sur-
vival. Perhaps the simplest way to make individual characteristics matter like this would be
for somatic capital to be an additional argument of survival probability, so that this became
p(K,N), where pK(K,N) > 0. Thus greater investment in somatic capital would increase
survival as well as adult output. Similar results to those here can then be obtained if the
function p(K,N)F(K,N,α) satisﬁes restrictions like those imposed on p(N)F(K,N,α) by
12Assumptions 1 and 2.
II.B.1 The Equilibrium Steady State
In any steady state such that N is constant, the ratio of adults to the young is p, so
economic feasibility yields the following characterization: p(N)F(K,N,α)=K. This model
then gives a prominent role to intergenerational transfers from adults to the young.4 Con-
sider further an “equilibrium steady state” where, in addition to this steady state condition,
K solves maxK≥ ¯ K
F(K,N,α)
K :
Lemma 1. From Assumption 1, it follows that, for each N ≥ 0, there exists a
unique optimal K ≥ ¯ K>0,K (N), say, maximizing
F(K,N,α)
K . If, as additional
hypotheses,
p(0)F(K(0),0,α)
K(0) > 1, but
p(N)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) < 1, when N is large enough,
there exists a unique equilibrium steady state, (N,K(N)) >> 0. This is the only
solution for N ≥ 0 and K ≥ ¯ K of
p(N)FK(K,N,α)=1and p(N)F(K,N,α)=K. (1)
Proof. Assumption 1 implies that, for each N ≥ 0, there exists a unique optimal K(N) ≥
¯ K maximizing
F(K,N,α)
K . Further, if V (N)=
p(N)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) , then V 0(N)=
p0F+pFN
K < 0.
Given that V (0) > 1, and V (N) < 1, for large N, existence of the unique equilibrium
steady state follows. Finally, K(N) is the only solution for K>¯ K(N,α), of the ﬁrst-order
4See Robson and Kaplan [2003] for data from hunter-gatherer societies concerning the importance of these
transfers.
13condition FK(K,N,α)K = F(K,N,α). It follows that the equilibrium steady state is the
only solution for N ≥ 0 and K ≥ ¯ K of p(N)F(K,N,α)=K and p(N)FK(K,N,α)=1 .
T h i se q u i l i b r i u ms t e a d ys t a t eh a st h ep r o p e r t yt h a ta n ya l t e r n a t i v et y p et h a te n t e r si n
small numbers will do worse in terms of ultimate descendants, so this state is the long run
prediction of the model.5 To see that this property holds, note that, if a given adult has



















Indeed, this follows since the fertility of the adult descendant at any date τ is
F(Kτ,N,α)
Kτ+1 ≡ fτ,
say. Although maximizing the number of oﬀspring at any given date t+1involves choosing
Kt+1 = ¯ K, it nevertheless follows that any type that does not maximize
F(Kt,N,α)
Kt at every
date t is eventually dominated by the type that does this:
Lemma 2. Consider an equilibrium steady state for a continuum population
composed of one type that chooses Kt = K(N), say, t =1 ,2,... ,w h e r eK0 =
K(N) also. (Each individual here is “inﬁnitesimally small” and also divisible.)
An adult of the original type at t =0has one adult descendant at each date
t>0. Suppose ˜ Nt is the similar stream of adult descendants for an adult at date
t =0of any alternative type choosing Kt ≥ ¯ K that do not maximize
F(Kt,N,α)
Kt at
5This result can be extended to a population that is not in a steady state. See Section II.B.4.
14every t =1 ,2,.... It follows that there exists a time T and δ>0 such that
˜ Nt < 1 − δ,for all t ≥ T. (3)
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the introduction of a single new individual has no eﬀect on the
population, N.I f t h e r e i s a ﬁnite number of deviations from K(N), (3) is immediate from
(2), for any T after the last deviation. Suppose then that there are inﬁnite number of
deviations, but (3) does not hold. Thus, for all δ>0, there exists a sequence {ti}∞
i=1 such
that ˜ Nti ≥ 1−δ, for all ti. It is without loss to suppose t1 is strictly after the ﬁrst deviation.
However, assuming δ is small enough, the only way to obtain ˜ Nti ≥ 1 − δ, despite this ﬁxed
ﬁrst deviation, is to choose ˜ Kti ≤ K(N)−ε, for some ε>0. Thus every date in the sequence
{ti}∞
i=1 involves such a deviation. Further, since these deviations are all at least ε>0,t h e
only way to overcome their cumulative eﬀect is to choose ˜ Kti → ¯ K. Assumption 1 then
implies that F( ˜ Kti,N,α)=0 , for large enough ti, so that ˜ Nti+1 =0and the deviating line
becomes extinct, yielding the desired contradiction.
Maximization of
F(Kt,N,α)
Kt at every date t is equivalent to the maximization of
F(Kt−1,N,α)
Kt F(Kt,N,α) at every t, since F(Kt−1,N,α) is given. This criterion is proportional
to the total output of all the immediate surviving descendants of a given adult at date t−1.
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the product of the number of oﬀspring, ft =
F(Kt−1,N,α)
Kt ,
and the “quality,” F(Kt,N,α), of each of them. Lemma 2 shows that these preferences over
quantity and the particular functional form of quality would be favored by natural selection.
The hypothesis underlying both models is then that humans were selected to have these
preferences by 2 million years of hunting and gathering. It is not that humans were selected
15to make a particular numerical choice of both quantity and quality. Rather they are as-
sumed to recognize the impact that investment in oﬀspring has on the adult income of these
oﬀspring, regardless of the functional form involved. Such ﬂexibility would be needed for
humans in foraging societies to make the right decisions in the wide spectrum of circum-
stances that presumably arose during this period. It is important that it is not required
that natural selection occur during the relatively brief transition to agriculture itself; rather
the characteristics of this transition just express these preferences. (Indeed, the behavior
induced by these preferences during the transition is fully biologically optimal even in the
short run.) Once these preferences are in place, that is, no further reliance need be placed
on the slow process of biological evolution.6
II.B.2 Population Maximized
Given the inclusion of population, N, in the production and survival functions, it is of
interest that there is no “biological externality” here. That is, the equilibrium steady state
yields the maximum population that could be obtained, even in principle, in any steady state.
Maximizing descendants as if N were ﬁxed is appropriate because N is itself maximized.
Lemma 3. Suppose that, in addition to the assumptions used in Lemma 1,
p(0)F(K,0,α) >K ,but p(N)F(K,N,α) <K ,if N is large enough, for all
6In other respects, evolved preferences may be inappropriate in modern contexts. Perhaps, for example,
our intense cravings for sweet and fatty foods, which were adaptive when calories were limited, now lead to
harmful overindulgence. (However, see Robson and Woutersen, 2005, for models in which it is evolutionarily
optimal for an increase in the food supply to decrease longevity.)
16K ≥ ¯ K. Then the unique equilibrium steady state is also the unique solution
to maxK≥ ¯ K N s.t. p(N)F(K,N,α)=K.
Proof. Under the stated conditions, the constraint p(N)F(K,N,α)=K yields N>0
as a function of K ≥ ¯ K. It then follows that (p0F + pFN)dN
dK + pFK =1 , so that dN
dK =0if
and only if pFK =1 . Further, d2N
dK2 =
−pFKK
p0F+pFN < 0, whenever dN
dK =0 , so that the equilibrium
steady state is the unique maximizer of N.
The above argument shows that maximization of N entails maximization of “proﬁt,”
p(N)F(K,N,α) − K, for that value of N. The individual interest in maximizing “average
product,”
p(N)F(K,N,α)
K , is then consistent with the social eﬃciency condition on the “marginal
product,” p(N)FK(K,N,α)=1 , given that “proﬁt” is zero. This is reminiscent of the
theory of perfect competition, although the incentives of the individual and society here are
not precisely analogous to those that apply there.
It follows that this equilibrium steady state also maximizes the total population of young
and adults,
N(1+p(N))
p(N) , since this is an increasing function of N. On the other hand, this steady
state does not maximize GNP, G, say, where G = NF(K,N,α), since dG
dK = NFK > 0, if
dN
dK =0 . By the same token, neither does it maximize per capita income, F(K,N,α).
II.B.3. Comparative Statics of the Equilibrium Steady State
Consider now the eﬀect of a sudden increase in α, representing a shift towards agriculture.
Note ﬁrst that an individual right at the boundary between agriculture and foraging would
have a private incentive to adopt agriculture, or to continue with it, because agriculture
17improves each child’s income, given Fα(K,N,α) > 0. Agriculture would then spread at the
expense of hunting and gathering.
Indeed, any individual engaged in agriculture after the transition would also see foraging
as an unambiguously worse alternative. This argument does not rely on the network exter-
nalities that imply it would be diﬃcult to be the only forager in an agricultural population,
despite the likely importance of these.
Consider then the eﬀe c tt h a tah i g h e rα throughout the population has on the resulting
equilibrium steady state, characterized as in (1). (The “additional hypotheses” of Lemma 1
remain true for small changes in α.) Hence, diﬀerentiating the second equation in (1) with







H e n c et h es h i f tt oa g r i c u l t u r er a i s e st h el o n g run level of the population, as a direct con-
sequence of the greater productivity of agriculture. In addition,
dp
dα = p0 dN
dα < 0, so that
mortality rises, due to this increased crowding.








so stature declines as a consequence of the shift to agriculture. That this key comparative
static result is implied by (1) can be seen as follows. A key eﬀect of this shift is that
the expected marginal product of capital, p(N)FK(K,N,α), falls because the increase in
population increases mortality, as reﬂected in the term p0FK < 0 in (5), thus helping reduce





p(N), say, on the other hand, must rise with the shift,
df
dα > 0,
since N rises. From the point of view of the entire population, it is inevitable that fertility
rises if mortality rises, as a consequence of a steady state. From the point of view of an
individual, however, the rise in fertility reﬂects a shift in favor of the quantity of oﬀspring
at the expense of the capital endowment, K.
An intuition for this shift is as follows. An increase in mortality decreases the marginal
beneﬁto ft h eq u a n t i t yo fo ﬀspring, simply because this quantity is deﬂated by the probability
of survival. However, quality is related to the potential number of grandchildren, and this
number is then doubly subject to the increase in mortality. Thus, an increase in mortality
reduces the marginal beneﬁto fq u a l i t yb ym o r et h a ni tr e d u c e st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto f
quantity.
T h er i s ei nt h eq u a n t i t yo fo ﬀspring is regardless of the eﬀect of the transition on income,
F(K,N,α)= K
































It is then suﬃcient for dF
dα < 0 that
FK
KFKK < −1. (This condition is that the factor demand for
K is elastic.) This condition and Assumption 1 can be satisﬁed, for example, if F(K,N,α)=
KβΨ(N)+α, for all β ∈ (0,1), where α<0, for all K ≥ ¯ K(N,α) > 0. It is plausible then
that income falls with the advent of agriculture. Income must, however, fall by a smaller
19percentage than somatic capital, given that fertility rises.
To sum up these comparative static results:
Theorem 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and the additional hypotheses of Lemma
1, it follows that dN
dα > 0 and that
df
dα > 0, so that population and fertility rise
with the advent of agriculture. It also follows that dK
dα < 0, so that physical
stature decreases. Given that, in addition,
FK
KFKK < −1, then dF
dα < 0, so income
falls.
Although no information is available on the impact of the neolithic transition on income,
these predictions are otherwise consistent with the observations discussed in Section II.A.
II.B.4. Dynamics
Consider now a population in an equilibrium steady state, which is subjected to an
increase in α. The short run dynamics by which the new equilibrium steady state is reached
a r en o we x p l o r e d . F o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t y ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nα is instantaneous here, but
qualitatively similar results would hold if this increase were instead continuous but suﬃciently
rapid.
First consider how the population evolves in general, without the steady state require-
ment. If there is a single type choosing an arbitrary somatic stock Kt, the adult population,
Nt, is governed by the diﬀerence equation:
Nt+1 = Ntp(Nt)F(Kt,N t,α)/Kt+1. (7)
20It simpliﬁes matters to consider the diﬀerential equation associated with this diﬀerence









where ˜ K(t) is the arbitrary continuous-time counterpart of Kt. Suppose now that ˜ K(t) ≡
K(N(t)) ≡ argmaxK≥ ¯ K
F(K,N(t),α)
K . Any equilibrium of (8), deﬁned now as N∗, say, is the
unique solution for N of
p(N)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) =1 , yielding the unique equilibrium steady state,
as in (1).
Use of such an associated diﬀerential equation is appropriate in general if the length of
each generation is small relative to the time for the transition. This seems reasonable here
with an intergenerational time of perhaps 20 years and a time for the transition of several
thousand years. In any case, the diﬀerential equation (8) focuses on the salient features of
the diﬀerence equation (7).
As an example of how matters are simpliﬁe d ,n o t et h a ti ti sp o s s i b l e( b u tn o n - t r i v i a l )t o
formulate and prove a generalization of Lemma 2 for (7). That is, it remains optimal, in
the sense of Lemma 2, to choose Kt to maximize
F(Kt,Nt,α)
Kt at every t =1 ,2,..., even when
population, Nt, is time-varying. However, in continuous time, as in (8), it is immediate that
any type that deviates from K = K(N(t)) on a set of times of positive measure will fall
permanently behind. That is, individuals who choose the optimal K in terms of the the given
preferences over the quality and quantity of children cannot be biologically outperformed by
any alternative choice, even in this general dynamic setting.
The diﬀerential equation has the following properties, where α is constant:
21Theorem 2A. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, as do the additional
hypotheses of Lemma 1. If N(0) <N ∗, then (8) implies that population N(t) ↑
N∗. Fertility f(t)=
F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) ↓ f∗ =
F(K(N∗),N∗,α)
K(N∗) . If, in addition, FKN >
FN/K, somatic capital K(t) ↑ K∗ = K(N∗). Income, F, may increase or decrease
in general. If, in addition,
FK
KFKK < −1 and FKN is close enough to zero, then
F(t) ↑ F(K∗,N∗,α). If income increases, then so must somatic capital.
Proof. Since
p(N)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) is a strictly decreasing function of N, an increasing path for
























FKK > 0, given that
FK
KFKK < −1 and FKN ≤ 0 is
suﬃciently close to zero. The last assertion is obvious, but also follows since dF
dt > 0 implies
FKN >F N/K.
The description of the short run dynamics is then completed by deriving the immediate
implications of the initial jump in α :
Theorem 2B. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that the additional
hypotheses of Lemma 1 hold throughout the range of α.I fα jumps up there can
be no jump in N. There is a jump up in fertility, f, but a jump down in somatic
capital, K. Income, F, jumps down given that
FK
KFKK < −1.
Proof. Fertility jumps up since
df
dα |N= ¯ N=
Fα(K(N),N,α)
K(N) > 0, by the envelope theorem,
holding N constant. Capital jumps down, however, since dK
dα |N= ¯ N=
Fα−KFKα
KFKK < 0. Income
22jumps down since dF
dα |N= ¯ N= FK
dK








FKK < 0, assuming
FK
KFKK < −1.
The implications of Theorems 1, 2A and 2B for population, N,fertility, f,somatic capital,
K, and income, F, are sketched in Figure 2. The assumptions underlying the detailed short
run eﬀects on somatic capital and income, as in Theorems 2A and 2B, are stronger than
those needed to obtain the long run eﬀects, as in Theorem 1. Under these assumptions,
however, the initial jumps in fertility, somatic capital, and income, as in Theorem 2B, are
exaggerations of the long run eﬀects, as in Theorem 1. The exaggerated eﬀects on fertility
and somatic capital would have made these shifts easier to identify empirically.
II.C. Related Theoretical Literature
Lee [1987] provides cogent arguments for the relevance of “carrying capacity” constraints
to human demography. If humans have institutions that prevent the absolute biologically
maximal population being reached, but that anticipate the same limits, a density-dependent
model would still be appropriate. Improvements in technology might enable the carrying ca-
pacity of an economy to be stretched, although not ﬁnally removed altogether. The present
model considers a technological shock in the form of a one-time improvement in productiv-
ity. More realistically, there should be continuing technological change, allowing continuing
population growth after the neolithic demographic transition, as presumably occurred.
An alternative, or complementary, hypothesis for the origin of agriculture is that it was







Figure 2: Model A Dynamics
24property nature of large prey, in particular, led to their overexploitation by humans and
eventual extinction.7 If more detailed data like those collected by Cohen and Armelagos
[1984], for example, showed that the declines in health, stature, and life expectancy started
b e f o r et h ea d v e n to fa g r i c u l t u r e ,t h i sw o u l ds u g g e s tt h a te x t i n c t i o no fl a r g eg a m ew a sa
contributing factor. In the ﬁrst place, however, further declines at or just after the transition
to agriculture would still warrant an explanation as in the current paper. Secondly, it should
be noted that a decline in availability of animal food might only cause a reduction in stature,
for example, in the short run. In the long run, it might be expected to instead cause a
reduction in the size of the human population. If a particular stature was adapted to a
foraging lifestyle, that is, the long run might restore this to its previous level.
Another theoretical hypothesis is oﬀered by Marceau and Myers [2000]. Based on a
theory of coalition formation, they argue that the advent of agriculture might have been
precipitated by technological change. Before this transition, there was a grand coalition
that somehow avoided overexploitation of the environment. At the transition, the grand
coalition splintered, resulting in a loss of eﬃciency that might have resulted in lower output
at ﬁrst. Marceau and Myers essentially reverse the pattern of overexploitation of a common
property resource found in Smith.8
The main contribution of the present paper is to oﬀer a new explanation for the eﬀects
7This is an alternative to an older theory that the end of the last ice age led to dessication of plant food
and hence a reduction in these prey animals. See Vernon Smith [1975].
8Weisdorf (2005) is a recent survey of anthroplogical and economic theories of the neolithic transition.
Most of these emphasize the key issue of the timing of this transition.
25of the transition to agriculture. A related explanation indeed applies to a more recent
demographic transition, as is shown next.
III. THE RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
III.A. Facts and Issues
The basic facts relevant here were not recently uncovered, as for the neolithic transition,
but are well-known. Most of the theoretical papers mentioned in Section III.D.2 below
include a sketch of these facts; a more detailed reference is Chesnais [1992]. The deﬁning
features of the demographic transition during industrialization are: 1) There is ﬁrst a fall
in the mortality rate, perhaps due to simple and cheap, but eﬀective, measures to improve
public health and medicine. This induces a growth spurt in the population. 2) The fertility
rate eventually falls, reestablishing a rough balance between the birth and death rates.
Within this broad outline, there was important variation across nations. In England,
for example, there was a steady rise in fertility after mortality began to fall, and fertility
only started to fall after a substantial lag. In France, on the other hand, fertility tracked
the fall in mortality much more closely, with the result that the French population increased
less dramatically than did the English.
Additional typical features of this recent transition include: 1) Income rises on average
during the transition. 2) Migration from the country to the city takes place. 3) The
educational system expands.
26The basic puzzle this raises is: Why did fertility fall sharply following a sharp fall in
mortality? That is, given that incomes rose, why would individuals not use the extra
resources to produce more oﬀspring?
III.B. Model B.
Again, the emphasis here is on why the recent transition had the eﬀects that it did, and
the important question of why the transition occurred when it did is not addressed.
In the model developed here, there are again two age classes–young and adult. The out-
put of each adult is F(K,N,α), where N is number of adults, but α now represents the shift
to urbanization and industrialization. Capital, K, is now reinterpreted as human capital–
such as education or on-the-job training. Thus the cross-partial derivatives FKN(K,N,α)
and FKα(K,N,α) now plausibly have the following signs:
Assumption 3. i) The dependence of F on K alone is qualitatively as in i) of
Assumption 1 for Model A. ii) Further, Fα(K,N,α) > 0, so that the direct eﬀect
of industrialization is to raise income, and FN(K,N,α) < 0, so that crowding re-
duces productivity, due to the presence of ﬁnite resources such as land. However,
the shift to industrial output at the expense of agriculture, or a larger population,
does not lower the marginal product of human capital, so that FKN(K,N,α) ≥ 0
and FKα(K,N,α) ≥ 0.
Ad e ﬁning characteristic of the recent demographic transition was the cheap but eﬀective
27suppression of infectious disease, for example. In Model B, then, mortality is taken as
exogenous:
Assumption 4. Improved public health is incorporated in the survival probability
f r o my o u n gt oa d u l t ,p(α) ∈ (0,1), say, where p0(α) > 0.
A natural generalization of Model would be to allow mortality to be inﬂuenced by popula-
tion. That is, although improved public health tended to decrease mortality, the increase in
population resulting from the transition, and urbanization, in particular, would have tended
to oﬀset this advantage. That is, population might be well be an additional argument of
survival probability, so that this became p(α,N), where pN(α,N) < 0. However, the quali-
tative results here will be as long as p(α,N)F(K,N,α) satisﬁes the restrictions imposed on
p(α)F(K,N,α) by Assumptions 3 and 4. The present formulation is then maintained for
simplicity.
For Model B, a result analogous to Lemma 1 holds:
Lemma 5. From Assumption 3, it follows that there exists a unique optimal
K ≥ ¯ K, K(N)=a r g m a x K≥ ¯ K
p(α)F(K,N,α)
K . As additional hypotheses, suppose
that
p(α)F(K(0),0,α)
K(0) > 1 and
p(α)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) < 1, if N is large enough. Then there
exists a unique equilibrium steady state, (N,K(N)) >> 0, the only solution for
N ≥ 0 and K ≥ ¯ K of
p(α)FK(K,N,α)=1and p(α)F(K,N,α)=K. (9)
28Lemma 2 for Model A remains true here, as stated. That is, if there is a type that
chooses K ≥ ¯ K to maximize
F(K,N,α)
K , in a steady state such that p(α)F(K,N,α)=K,t h e n
this type cannot be outdone by any alternative behavior. The criterion can be interpreted as
the evolved preferences over the quantity and quality of oﬀspring, as before. Again, there is
no “biological externality” so no steady-state population can exceed that in the equilibrium
steady state, and a version of Lemma 3 and the following remarks hold here.
III.B.1. Comparative Statics of the Equilibrium Steady State
Consider now the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nα, representing the eﬀect of better public health
and of industrialization. (The “additional hypotheses” of Lemma 5 hold for small changes in
α.)D i ﬀerentiating the second condition in (9) with respect to α and using the ﬁrst condition







so that population rises, as a consequence of the lower mortality and greater productivity
arising in the industrial revolution.









so that human capital rises also. In these circumstances, that is, lower mortality increases
the expected marginal product of capital, p(α)FK(K,N,α), as reﬂected in the term p0FK > 0
in (11), so tending to increase the demand for capital, K. The assumptions that FKα ≥ 0
and FKN ≥ 0 reinforce this eﬀect.
29On the other hand, fertility f = F
K = 1
p(α) must fall since p0(α) > 0. From the point of
view of the entire population, fertility must fall if mortality falls, as a consequence of the
deﬁnition of a steady state. From the point of view of an individual, however, fertility falls
because individuals choose to favor the human capital endowment of each oﬀspring, K, over
the quantity of these oﬀspring.
Again, an intuition for this shift is that a decrease in mortality increases the marginal
beneﬁto fq u a l i t yb ym o r et h a ni ti n c r e a s e st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto ft h eq u a n t i t yo fc h i l d r e n .
This is because quality is related to the potential number of grandchildren, and so is doubly
subject to this decrease in mortality.
This reduction in the quantity of oﬀspring arises regardless of the direction of the change
in income, F = K




























Hence it is suﬃcient for dF
dα > 0 that
FK
KFKK < −1, so income rises in the long run. Since
fertility falls, however, income must rise by a smaller percentage than does human capital.
To sum up all these comparative statics results for Model B:
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, as do the additional hypotheses
of Lemma 5. It follows that dN
dα > 0, so that population rises as a result of
industrialization and better public health. It also follows that
df
dα < 0, so that
30fertility falls, but that dK
dα > 0, so that human capital rises. Given that, in
addition,
FK
KFKK < −1, then dF
dα > 0, and income also rises.
These predictions are all consistent with the observations sketched in Section III.A.
It is worth noting that the capital stock here might instead be interpreted as stature, as
in Model A. It is not immediately obvious what the sign of the cross-partials of K with N
and α should then be, but they seem likely to be small, in any case. Suppose they are zero,
for simplicity. An appropriate version of Model B then implies that the recent demographic
transition would ultimately increase stature, since the reduction in mortality increases the
marginal product of this capital. Such an increase in stature is ongoing, in fact, but has
so far merely roughly restored the stature humans had during hunting and gathering. (See
Angel [1975, Table 1], for example.) A general model might incorporate both these stocks,
but this seems unlikely to add much to understanding the issues.
III.B.2. Dynamics
Consider now a sharp once-and-for-all increase in α. Without requiring a steady state,
if there is a single type choosing an arbitrary human capital level Kt, the total population,
Nt, now evolves according to
Nt+1 = Ntp(α)F(Kt,N t,α)/Kt+1. (13)









31where K(N)=a r gm a x K≥ ¯ K
F(K,N,α)
K . This diﬀerential equation again focuses on the salient
properties of the diﬀerence equation. Any steady state of (14), N∗, say, is the unique so-
lution of
p(α)F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) =1 , the unique equilibrium steady state, as in (9). Again, it is
immediate that any type that deviates from K = K(N) on a positive measure of times will
fall permanently behind. Again, that is, individuals who choose the optimal K in terms of
the current preferences over the quality and quantity of children cannot be biologically out-
performed by any alternative choice, even in this general dynamic setting. This diﬀerential
equation has the following properties, where α is constant:
Theorem 4A. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, as do the additional hypotheses
of Lemma 5. If N(0) <N ∗, then (14) implies that population N(t) ↑ N∗, whereas
fertility, f(t)=
F(K(N),N,α)
K(N) ↓ f∗ =
F(K(N∗),N∗,α)
K(N∗) . Human capital, K(t) ↑ K∗ =
K(N∗). Finally, given that
FK
KFKK < −1, income F(t) ↑ F(K∗,N∗,α).




























The description of the short run dynamics is then completed by considering the immediate
eﬀects of the jump up in α.
Theorem 4B. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold and the additional hypotheses
of Lemma 5 hold throughout the range of α.I f α jumps up, there can be no
32jump in the population, N. However, fertility jumps up. Human capital, K,
may jump down, which occurs if Fα >K F Kα. Income, F, may also jump down,
which occurs if
FK
KFKK < −1 and FKα is small enough. If income jumps down,
despite the rise in α, so must human capital.
Proof. Fertility jumps up since
df
dα |N= ¯ N=
Fα(K,N,α)
K > 0, by the envelope theorem.
Capital is aﬀected by α via dK
dα |N= ¯ N=
Fα−KFKα
KFKK . Hence dK
dα |N= ¯ N< 0 if Fα >K F Kα. Income
jumps down since dF








FKK < 0, given that
FK
KFKK < −1 and
FKα ≥ 0 is small enough. The ﬁnal assertion is obvious, but also follows since dF
dα |N= ¯ N< 0
implies Fα >K F Kα.
The combined implications of Theorems 3, 4A, and 4B for population, N, fertility, f,
human capital, K, and income, F, a r es k e t c h e di nF i g u r e3 . N o t et h a tt h ea s s u m p t i o n s
underlying the detailed short run eﬀects on human capital and income, as in Theorems 4A
and 4B, are stronger than those needed for the long run eﬀects, as in Theorem 3. Under
these assumptions, however, the initial jumps in fertility, f, human capital, K, and income,
F, are all in the opposite direction to the long run changes, as is discussed next.
If the increase in the parameter α w e r et oo c c u ro v e rap e r i o do ft i m e ,r a t h e rt h a na l l
at once, the direction of the change in fertility, f, human capital, K, and income, F, would
be ambiguous, in the short run. Thus, if this increase in α were slow enough, fertility, for
example, would fall in the short run as well as in the long run. Indeed, although atypical,
such a pattern was observed in France during the industrial revolution. (See Chesnais
[1992].)
33It might for that matter be realistic to suppose that the increase in α is maintained in a
gradual fashion beyond the initial shock, thus capturing continued technological innovation.
If this continued increase is suﬃciently slow, the present model would reach a slowly evolving
equilibrium. That is, during this phase, population, human capital and income would
continue to rise, but fertility would continue to fall.
III.C. The Accuracy of the Dynamic Predictions
Model B predicts that, during the demographic transition, fertility will ﬁrst rise, as in
Theorem 4B, then decline, as in Theorem 4A, and end up at a new lower level, as in Theorem
3. (See Figure 3.) Indeed, Dyson and Murphy [1985] marshal substantial evidence that
such a pattern was typical during the European demographic transition and during many
subsequent transitions. It is worth noting that, if Model B were simpliﬁed so that the
parameter α aﬀected only mortality, there would be no immediate eﬀect of a jump in α on
fertility, despite the fall in fertility that would still arise in the long run. Only when there
is a one-time increase in productivity as well as a decline in mortality, is the demographic
transition inaugurated in this way by a sharp rise in fertility.
Similarly, Model B predicts that income and human capital both ﬁrst jump down, as
in Theorem 4B, then rise steadily, as in Theorem 4A, and end up at a higher level, as in
Theorem 3. (Again, see Figure 3.) Indeed, a popular, but not universal, view among
economic historians is that, at the start of the industrial transition, real wages rose on







Figure 3: Model B Dynamics
35declined, as would be predicted by the version of Model B sketched following Assumption
3 in Section III.B. (See Feinstein [1998] for British data and Margo [2000] for the US.)
Ultimately, of course, real wages rose substantially. Goldin and Katz [1996] suggest that
physical capital and human capital were originally substitutes, so that skilled labor was at
ﬁrst displaced by machines. More recently, however, physical capital and human capital
became complements, so that continued investment drove up the real wage. The present
explanation is related in that lower human capital is also responsible here for the drop in
income. However, there is no physical capital here.
III.D. Related Literature
III.D.1. Biology, Anthropology, etc.
The recent demographic transition has attracted a great deal of applied theoretical work,
both outside economics and inside. Only some of the relevant highlights are then covered
here. First, the recent demographic transition has been used to motivate the need to aug-
ment the theory of biological evolution with cultural evolution. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
[1981, especially Chapter 3.9] use such a theory to show that the culturally determined choice
of a smaller family might spread if the tendency to imitate is suﬃciently strong relative to
the natural selection against such a choice. Although it is plausible that a tendency to
imitate might have an evolutionary basis, this basis is weakened to the extent that it is used
to explain phenomena contrary to natural selection, as it is here. In any case, the present
model shows that biologically appropriate behavior can explain the stylized facts.
There are also a number of papers that consider the cross-sectional link between fertility
36and income. That is, a biological perspective apparently implies that richer individuals
would have more oﬀspring than poorer individuals. Evidence on the actual relationship of
fertility to wealth in modern societies is mixed. Daly and Wilson [1983, Figure 12-5, p. 334],
for example, present data from the US census implying a positive relationship, controlling
for the wife’s age. Vining [1986], on the other hand, as part of a substantial critique of
sociobiology, presents evidence of a negative relationship.
Such a negative relationship is not fatal in itself to a biological view. Rogers [1990], for
example, reports some success in obtaining a non-monotonic relationship between current
fertility and wealth. In his model, long-run reproductive success is only partially determined
by current fertility since oﬀspring generate some of their own income.
The present analysis implies that diﬀerential mortality could also help explain a negative
relationship between wealth and fertility. The wealthy are healthier than the poor and have
longer lives, so it is optimal for them to invest more in their oﬀspring’s human capital. As
in Model B, this would reduce their fertility but increase the income of the oﬀspring of the
wealthy and thus produce more descendants in the long run.
III.D.2. Economics
A landmark paper in the economic treatment of fertility is Becker and Barro [1988].
They assume that each parent’s utility depends on the parent’s consumption, the number
of oﬀspring and the utility of each of them. This yields a dynastic utility that depends
on the consumption and number of descendants throughout the entire family line. Parents
inherit capital, earn additional income, consume, and use the remainder to reproduce and
37to bequeath capital to each child. Becker and Barro derive a number of implications of
this–for example, that fertility is increased by a rise in the interest rate. In particular, they
show that a one-time decline in mortality produces a one-time increase in fertility, followed
by a fall in later generations, as consistent with the evidence in Section III.C.
An important contribution to understanding the demographic transition is due to Galor
and Moav [2002]. They derive the eﬀects of demographic transition itself, but also explain
how human society might be mired for a long time in a Malthusian regime, then suddenly
undergo an industrial and demographic growth spurt, and next enter a phase of sustained
growth. (See also Galor and Weil [2000].) Galor and Moav’s model is literally evolutionary
in that preferences over quality and quantity of children diﬀer and are subject to pressure
from the economic environment. During the Malthusian era, there is slow but persistent
natural selection in favor of preferences emphasizing quality. Eventually, the number of
individuals with such preferences is enough that the resulting technological progress pushes
the economy into a virtuous cycle of growth. To produce the fall in fertility during the
transition itself, they assume that each oﬀspring requires an input of time from their parents.
Galor and Moav are remarkably successful in accounting for a wide sweep of human
economic history. The key issue here, however, is: Was there suﬃc i e n tt i m ef o rn a t u r a l
selection to have had such substantial eﬀects? If natural selection had worked so fast,
wouldn’t most of the modern European population descend from a tiny minority in the
population prior to the industrial revolution, those who had preferences emphasizing the
quality of their children? Wouldn’t there be clear evidence of this–that most surnames
38died out over the relevant period, for example? The present paper shows that these awkward
questions can be sidestepped, at least from the point of view of understanding the eﬀects of
the transition. That is, it is not necessary for natural selection to have acted in a literal
sense over the relatively short period of the transition. Rather preferences that would have
been biologically selected over our entire evolutionary history account for the stylized facts
during the transition. Indeed, these preferences ensure that biological ﬁtness is maximized
during and immediately after the transition itself. Thus the phenomena arising during this
transition do not conﬂict with a fundamentally biological view of behavior.
Recently, Soares [2002] developed an economic model of the recent demographic transition
key aspects of which reinforce the present biological approach. Thus, he treats mortality
as the primary determinant of human capital and fertility. This contrasts with the usual
economic assumption that the primary determinant of fertility is income. He presents
supporting evidence that mortality has varied substantially, independently of income, and
veriﬁes that this approach has empirical validity, considering changes also in post-transition
economies. To incorporate mortality, Soares modiﬁes the utility function of adults to include
life expectancy of children as an additional argument. An increase in life expectancy then
increases the marginal product of human capital and tilts the balance between the quantity
and quality of children in favor of quality. However, he maintains the assumption concerning
the time input required for each oﬀspring.
Indeed, this assumption is typical in the economics literature on the recent demographic
transition. (It is also made by Greenwood and Sheshadri [2002], for example.) From an
39economic viewpoint, a higher wage rate then implies that children have a higher opportunity
cost in terms of other forms of consumption, perhaps then reducing the quantity of oﬀspring
chosen, as required. This assumption certainly seems to go beyond a biological viewpoint.
From such a viewpoint, other forms of consumption have no independent value–the only
biological ﬁnal good is oﬀspring. It then seems inevitable that a relaxation of the income
constraint could not decrease the value of the objective criterion–the number of these oﬀ-
spring.
A key issue then with respect to the last two economic models concerns the formulation
of preferences: It seems these preferences are inconsistent with biology. But, if so, why
the divergence? Were the required preferences optimal under some plausible set of previous
circumstances?
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper develops two related models that replicate the somewhat puzzling
shifts observed during two widely separated demographic transitions. This reinforces the
v a l i d i t yo ft h ea p p r o a c hh e r e . Ak e yf e a t u r eo ft h em o d e l sh e r ei st oi n t r o d u c ec a p i t a l –
somatic or human–in the simplest possible way.
The simplicity of the models serve to illuminate the basic issues. However, they cannot
be taken literally. One desirable direction for generalization would be to include more than
two age classes, where individuals at various ages allocate scarce resources among existing
oﬀspring of various vintages and to current reproduction. A second desirable extension
40would be to allow consumption. A form of consumption that is consistent with the present
biological perspective is expenditure to maintain health and hence to reduce mortality. A
ﬁnal desirable extension of Model B, in particular, would be to allow for investment in
physical capital as well as human capital. Such generalized models, however, should remain
capable of producing the eﬀects found here.
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